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Cognitive neuroscience enables us now to decompose major depressive disorder into
dysfunctional component processes and relate these processes to specific neural sub-
strates.This approach can be used to illuminate the biological basis of altered psychological
processes in depression, including abnormal decision-making. One important decision-
related process is counterfactual thinking, or the comparison of reality to hypothetical
alternatives. Evidence suggests that individuals with depression experience exaggerated
emotional responses due to focusing on counterfactual decision outcomes in general and
regret, i.e., the emotion associated with focus on an alternative superior outcome, in
particular. Regret is linked to self-esteem in that it involves the evaluation of an individ-
ual’s own decisions. Alterations of self-esteem, in turn, are a hallmark of depression. The
literature on the behavioral and neural processes underlying counterfactual thinking, self-
esteem, and depression is selectively reviewed. A model is proposed in which unstable
self-representation in depression is more strongly perturbed when a different choice would
have produced a better outcome, leading to increased feelings of regret. This approach
may help unify diverse aspects of depression, can generate testable predictions, and
may suggest new treatment avenues targeting distorted counterfactual cognitions, atten-
tional biases toward superior counterfactual outcomes, or increased affective response to
regretted outcomes.
Keywords: major depressive disorder, decision-making, emotions, neurosciences, self concept, neostriatum,
cognition, affect
INTRODUCTION
Major depressive disorder (MDD) has a substantial negative
impact on both individuals and society, with a lifetime preva-
lence of 16%, and a 12-month prevalence of 6% (1, 2), yet our
mechanistic understanding of the behavioral and brain processes
underlying this disorder is still incomplete. One approach for
understanding depression draws on models of cognitive and
neural processes derived from cognitive psychology and cognitive
neuroscience. In this approach, depression is viewed as result-
ing from dysfunction of component processes. For example, it
has been argued that depression involves alterations in mem-
ory processes (3, 4), attention (5, 6), mental schemas (7, 8),
and the reward systems of the brain (9, 10). Decision-making is
another process which may be altered in depression. Research in
decision-making has brought together researchers from a number
of disciplines including economists, psychologists, and neurosci-
entists. This review focuses on one specific process involved in
decision-making: counterfactual thinking, i.e., the comparison of
reality with hypothetical alternatives or “what might have been.”
A wealth of literature has indicated that people compare the out-
comes of their decisions with alternative outcomes which did
not occur, and that these comparisons influence the value they
place on the actual outcome (11, 12). Counterfactual comparisons
can influence the decisions that individuals make by affecting
the valuation of outcomes but also via the emotional reactions
to the outcomes of their decisions. A special class of counterfac-
tual thinking is self-related, involving counterfactual scenarios in
which the individual made a different choice. One possible conse-
quence of this type of counterfactual thinking is regret, an emotion
which has been shown to affect decision-making (13). Studies
have found that proneness to regret is correlated with depressive
symptoms (14).
Depression has long been linked to abnormalities in self-
representation. In particular, it is known that fragile self-esteem
(self-esteem which is particularly responsive to external events)
is an important risk factor for developing depression (15).
This review will argue that fragile self-esteem plays a role in
altered processing of self-related counterfactuals in depression.
Specifically, the brittle self-representation in depression is more
strongly perturbed when a different choice would have pro-
duced a better outcome, leading to increased feelings of regret.
This in turn will cause a devaluation of the actually experienced
outcome.
Understanding the connections between counterfactual think-
ing, self-esteem, and depression may yield valuable insights into
the nature of depression. Specifically, it may be useful in attempts
to construct a unifying framework for diverse aspects of depres-
sion, including developmental, social, environmental, cognitive,
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affective, and biological. Self-esteem, along with the broader
self concept, may be particularly helpful as a unifying construct
because it is intimately related to cognition, affect, and social
relationships and is thought to play a mediating role between envi-
ronmental stressors and the affective and biological responses to
those stressors (16). The self has been central to discussions of
depression within diverse theoretical orientations. Investigating
how self-esteem affects decision-making in depression may fur-
ther help to elucidate the role of self concept in cognition, affect,
and behavior in this disorder.
This review synthesizes an array of research from social and
personality psychology, cognitive psychology, and neuroscience.
The aim is to yield new insights into the role of counterfac-
tual thinking in depression, a topic that has received relatively
little attention. The model of altered counterfactual processing
in depression proposed here could be used to generate new,
testable predictions about counterfactual thinking and regret in
depression.
The review involved searches for publications on decision-
making, counterfactual thinking, self-esteem, and depression.
Given the scope of each topic, a comprehensive review of all topics
was not feasible, so a selective review was performed with emphasis
on research relating the areas to one another and to neuroscientific
findings. First, the role of counterfactual thinking in decision-
making will be examined. Second, an overview will be provided of
research on self-esteem. Third, these constructs will be linked to
dysfunctions of decision-making in depression. Fourth, a simple
model of the interaction between self-esteem and counterfactual
thinking in depression will be proposed.
COUNTERFACTUAL THINKING
CONCEPTUALIZING DECISION-MAKING
In order to understand the role of counterfactual thinking in
decision-making, it is helpful to review the process by which deci-
sions are made. One approach to conceptualize decision-making
is to distinguish between the different phases of the choice process.
Prior to a decision, the decision maker is presented with various
options or choices. Accounts of human decision-making typically
argue that, during this phase, the decision maker will anticipate
various possible outcomes of each choice (17–19). After this phase,
a choice is selected. Many accounts of decision-making assume
that choice selection is based, in part, on the subjective value of the
various outcomes (20, 21). After making a decision, the decision
maker often learns the outcome of the decision, and may addition-
ally learn or imagine the alternative outcomes of the options which
were not selected. The decision maker may then have an emo-
tional response to this information. Importantly, some accounts
of decision-making emphasize the idea that, prior to selecting a
choice, decision makers will anticipate not only the possible out-
comes of the choice, but the emotional responses to the various
outcomes. This anticipatory affect then helps to guide decision-
making (22, 23). Various factors can contribute to the emotional
response to an outcome other than the outcome itself. For exam-
ple, the emotional response may be affected by alternative possible
outcomes which did not occur (11, 22), by the individual’s expec-
tations (22), or by whether the outcome results from an action vs.
an inaction (24).
OVERVIEW OF COUNTERFACTUAL THINKING
Evaluating the actual outcomes of past actions and the antic-
ipated outcomes of future actions is central to the process of
decision-making. Studies of human decision-making have shown
that individuals evaluate outcomes in comparison to other pos-
sible outcomes, rather than evaluating the outcomes in and of
themselves. When experiencing the result of a particular choice,
an individual can examine how this outcome compares to the
imagined outcomes of other possible choices. For example, if
a choice has led to a small gain but there was an opportunity
for a significantly larger gain, individuals may process the small
gain as a loss compared to the missed superior outcome. This
evaluation of hypothetical alternative outcomes in relation to the
experienced and actualized outcome is referred to as counterfac-
tual thinking. Counterfactual thinking is ubiquitous in humans
and is often framed in phrases such as “what might have been,”
and “if only.”
Research has identified some of the factors that determine
whether an individual will engage in counterfactual thinking at
a particular time, and what types of counterfactual outcomes are
considered. These investigations have suggested that counterfac-
tual thinking is influenced by whether an outcome is expected or
unexpected as well as by the focus of an individual’s attention. For
example, Kahneman and Tversky have found that“close calls,”such
as barely missing a flight, often lead people to consider counter-
factual outcomes (e.g., the possibility of having made the flight).
The same authors found that people often imagine counterfactual
scenarios which remove a surprising element from what actually
occurred (25). For example, one person might be delayed by traf-
fic on a rural road, while another is delayed by traffic in a busy
city at rush hour. The person on the rural road would be more
likely to focus on a counterfactual situation in which there was no
traffic because the experience of traffic in this context is surpris-
ing and unexpected. Counterfactuals can also be constructed by
manipulating the events upon which people are focused (25). If
someone is focused on their own behavior, they might generate a
counterfactual in which they acted differently – a self-related coun-
terfactual. In the same situation, someone focused on the behavior
of others might generate a counterfactual in which another person
acted differently. In summary, people typically engage in coun-
terfactual thinking after a surprising event; they compare the
actual outcome to an alternative that would have been less sur-
prising. Additionally, people who are focused on themselves and
their own behavior are more likely to imagine themselves having
behaved differently, a process known as self-related counterfactual
thinking.
THE AFFECTIVE EXPERIENCE
The consideration of counterfactual outcomes can influence a
person’s experience of the outcome and generate specific emo-
tional responses; among these are disappointment, regret, and
relief. In disappointment, an outcome is compared unfavorably
to an alternate possible outcome. Disappointment is contrasted
with relief, which occurs when an outcome is compared favor-
ably to an alternate possible outcome. One study examined dis-
appointing wins (when a person wins money, but could have
won more) as well as relieving losses (a person loses money,
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but could have lost more). By using self-report measures of
emotions, the study found that both disappointing wins and
relieving losses result in mixed feelings – both positive and
negative emotions co-existing at the same time (12). In sum-
mary, both disappointment and relief involve comparison of
an actual outcome to a superior or inferior one that did not
occur.
Regret, an emotion that is frequent when an individual engages
in counterfactual thinking, occurs after making a choice and later
learning or imagining that a different choice would have produced
a better outcome. Like disappointment, regret involves compari-
son of reality to a superior alternative outcome, however, regret
involves counterfactual situations in which the individual acted
differently. Regret therefore involves self-related counterfactual
thinking (26). Studies have found that regret is specifically associ-
ated with a sense of responsibility, whereas disappointment occurs
in the case of a bad outcome for which a person does not feel
responsible (27, 28). People are also more likely to anticipate regret
when they expect feedback about their actions; if a person will
never know what would have happened if they made a different
choice, they will be less likely to feel regret. Studies have shown that
the expectation of feedback has a substantial effect on decisions
by increasing avoidance of anticipated regret (29, 30). For exam-
ple, if people expect to learn the outcome of a lottery whether
they play or not, they will be more likely to play the lottery; this
is thought to be due to the fear of regretting the outcome if they
choose not to play and later learn they would have won. Regret is
a highly aversive emotion; a study using self-report measures of
satisfaction with outcome in a simple gambling task found that
regret induced a more negative rating than disappointment for
an equivalent monetary outcome (31). Overall, the research on
regret has indicated that it is an aversive emotion in response
to discovering that a different choice would have led to a better
outcome.
DYSFUNCTIONAL PATTERNS
Altered counterfactual thinking has been linked to a number
of dysfunctional patterns of cognition and behavior. One such
pattern is maladaptive perfectionism, a desire for a “perfect” out-
come that results in significant negative affect when such an
outcome is not achieved. Maladaptive perfectionism is associ-
ated with the propensity to focus more heavily on hypothetical
alternative outcomes which were superior to the actual outcome
(32). Maladaptive perfectionism has been associated with a wide
range of mental illnesses including depression (33–37), anxiety
disorders (38), obsessive compulsive disorder (39), and eating
disorders (40–42).
Counterfactual thinking has also been linked to rumination,
a negative and repetitive thought process. It has been suggested
that some individuals experience ruminations about what might
have gone better, resulting in negative affect (43). Some individuals
may experience a “vicious circle” in which counterfactual think-
ing creates negative affect, which then leads to more counterfactual
thinking (44). One recent study showed that individuals with more
negative affect tended to spontaneously generate more counterfac-
tual thoughts in a fictional diary entry (45). Rumination is closely
linked with depression (46).
In summary, comparison to counterfactual outcomes has an
important effect on how real outcomes are valued. When things
could have gone better, people feel negative emotions such as dis-
appointment or regret. Regret is distinct from disappointment in
that it involves self-focused counterfactuals, i.e., those in which the
individual acted differently.
NEURAL SUBSTRATES UNDERLYING COUNTERFACTUAL
THINKING
REWARD, DECISION-MAKING, AND THE BRAIN
The following section will provide evidence that counterfactual
outcomes modulate responses in reward-sensitive brain areas.
Before reviewing this evidence, it will be useful to very briefly
review the construct of reward as it relates to neuroscience
and decision-making. It must be emphasized that a compre-
hensive overview of this topic is outside the scope of the cur-
rent review. Reward is a complex process, involving anticipa-
tion as well as consummation of a rewarding stimulus, which
may recruit distinct brain regions (47). The term reward also
encompasses both a subjectively pleasurable state as well as a rein-
forcing effect on behavior (48). A body of evidence now exists
showing rewards from a diverse array of separate domains (e.g.,
financial rewards, social rewards, food and drink, sex, entertain-
ment, and drugs of abuse) appear to be processed by the same
brain networks, including the striatum and the medial prefrontal
cortex (mPFC), including the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) and
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) (20, 21). It has been
argued that these brain regions encode a common, domain-
general representation of “value” which allows people to rank
their preferences and choose between diverse outcomes (such
as foregoing food in favor of an addictive drug) (20, 21). For
this reason, reward and decision-making are closely linked. Spe-
cific subregions of reward-related brain areas may have special-
ized functions. For example, evidence has indicated that lat-
eral OFC is activated after a punishing outcome, while medial
OFC is activated after a rewarding outcome (49). Lateral OFC
is also more likely to be activated when an action is made
which requires suppression of previously rewarded behaviors (50)
and when unsteady associations of stimuli and outcome require
response shifts (51). An alternative account suggests that the
medial OFC tracks intrinsic or short-term value, while the lat-
eral OFC tracks extrinsic or long-term reward value (52). The
medial prefrontal cortex (PFC) has also been shown to exhibit
functional sub-specialization, with the more ventral regions show-
ing more of a role in reward-related tasks, while the dorsal
regions are involved in perspective-taking and episodic memory
retrieval (53). Finally, the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) also
appears to have regional specialization, with the rostral portion
involved in emotional processes and the dorsal portion involved
in cognition (54, 55).
In addition to a set of brain areas, research into the neural basis
of reward and decision-making has also implicated a set of neu-
rotransmitters in these processes. While a complete overview of
this literature is outside the scope of this review, a brief discus-
sion of the most significant findings is warranted. Of the neu-
rotransmitter systems that may be involved in decision-making,
the most important is likely dopamine and its role in reward
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processes. A number of hypotheses have been put forward relating
dopamine to reward processing, including the idea that dopamine
contributes to the hedonic aspects of rewarding stimuli, that
dopamine codes for a “reward prediction error” signal that guides
learning, and that dopamine signals the incentive salience of a
stimulus, thereby motivating the pursuit of rewards (56). While
a full discussion of these hypotheses is outside the scope of this
review, it is helpful to note that dopamine appears to play a key
role in reward processes. Furthermore, dopaminergic neurons in
the midbrain are known to project heavily to the striatum (57)
and to the PFC and ACC (58). The striatum in turn is con-
nected to frontal areas including the OFC, ACC, and mPFC in
a series of circuits (59). Dopamine has been linked to value-
based choice (60) and risk-based decisions (61). Besides dopamine,
another neurotransmitter which may be important in decision-
making is norepinephrine, which appears to signal uncertainty
with respect to decision outcomes (62). Other neuromodula-
tory neurotransmitters, such as serotonin, also likely play a role,
although the function is somewhat less clear at this time. For
example, serotonin may be involved in consideration of delayed
rewards (62).
Despite some limitations of fMRI, including limited tempo-
ral resolution (63), susceptibility artifacts (64), and physiological
and non-physiological noise limiting its signal to noise ratio (63),
significant progress has been made to identify the role of certain
neural systems in counterfactual decision-making, which will be
reviewed in the next section.
COUNTERFACTUAL EFFECTS ON REWARD-SENSITIVE BRAIN AREAS
Functional neuroimaging and lesion studies have begun to elu-
cidate the brain basis of counterfactual thinking and its role in
decision-making. Counterfactual thinking appears to depend on
the OFC (31, 65–67). Several other areas, including the sublentic-
ular extended amygdala and striatum show levels of activation
which depend on both the actual outcome and the alternative,
counterfactual outcome (68). One imaging study used a “wheel
of fortune” gambling task in which different outcomes (gains and
losses) were available on each trial. The study found that the activ-
ity in the nucleus accumbens and sublenticular extended amygdala
in response to winning $0 depended on what the counterfac-
tual outcome would have been: when the non-obtained outcome
would have been a loss, the nucleus accumbens and sublenticular
extended amygdala showed more activation in response to a $0
outcome than if the non-obtained outcome would have been a
gain (68). This suggests that these brain structures respond not
merely to the monetary outcome, but to the outcome in contrast
to the counterfactual outcome. A $0 outcome is treated more like
a gain when contrasted with a counterfactual loss, but is treated
more like a loss when contrasted with a counterfactual gain. Simi-
larly, another study found that several reward-sensitive brain areas
including the striatum respond to a monetary reward relative to
the alternative possible outcomes. This study used a simple gam-
bling task in which subjects selected one of three cards to obtain
a monetary outcome. Trials were divided into gain trials, in which
the best outcome was a monetary gain and the worst outcome was
no gain, and loss trials, in which the best outcome was no loss and
the worst outcome was a loss. A large win in a gain trial (when the
alternatives were a smaller gain or no gain) resulted in similar levels
of activation as did no loss in a loss trial (when the alternatives were
a large loss and a smaller loss) (69). In summary, activity in reward
areas depends not only on the actual outcome but the alternative
outcome as well. When the alternative outcome would have been
better, activity in reward areas is decreased; when the alternative
would have been worse, reward areas are more active. These neu-
roimaging findings parallel the behavioral and self-report studies
reviewed above showing that the subjective value of an outcome
depends on the unrealized alternative outcomes.
THE NEURAL BASIS OF REGRET
Several studies have specifically examined the neural basis of
regret. For example, patients with lesions of the OFC, unlike nor-
mal controls, were not influenced by counterfactual outcomes in
a simple gambling task, and did not report feeling regret when
the outcome of a different choice would have been better (65).
In a neuroimaging study, a task condition designed to increase
the sense of agency for a decision resulted in decreased striatal
activity after a loss (70). Another study found decreased ventral
striatal activity when the alternative choice in a gamble would
have been superior (a regret-related outcome), compared to when
the alternative choice would have been inferior (a relief-related
outcome) (71). In a study which manipulated the degree of the
subject’s responsibility for an outcome, the amygdala was more
highly activated in response to regret-related outcomes when
subjects had higher levels of objective and subjective responsi-
bility (72). Another study found enhanced activity in the medial
orbitofrontal region, the ACC, and the hippocampus with increas-
ing regret (calculated as the actual outcome subtracted from the
superior alternative outcome) (13). In the same study, amygdala
and medial orbitofrontal activity increased during anticipation of
regret. One study comparing regret with disappointment found
that both emotions caused activation of the anterior insula and
dorsomedial PFC, but regret specifically activated the OFC (31).
In summary, neuroimaging studies have shown that areas known
to be involved in decision-making (20, 21), including the OFC,
amygdala, nucleus accumbens, and medial PFC, all respond not
only to actual outcomes, but to actual outcomes in compari-
son to counterfactual outcomes. When the alternative outcome
would have been better, reward areas such as the striatum show
lower activation. Contrastingly, the amygdala, anterior cingulate,
insula, and OFC appear to show increased activity in response to
regret-related outcomes. Furthermore, a lesion study, along with a
number of neuroimaging studies, suggests that the OFC may play
a critical role in counterfactual-related regret (65, 67). Generally,
the OFC is believed to encode the expected value of various choices
in the context of the organism’s current goals (73, 74). The OFC is
thought to assign a value to a stimulus in a manner which is mod-
ulated by the internal state of the organism (75). For example, the
value of food depends on whether the organism is hungry. It is
possible that the OFC plays a similar role in modulating the value
of a stimulus depending on counterfactual outcomes (such as a
decrease in valuation of an outcome when a better outcome could
have been obtained). In general, the OFC plays a role in linking
cognitive processes to emotion, and counterfactual thinking may
be one cognitive process which modulates emotion in a top-down
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fashion via the OFC (13). Further research may help elucidate the
relationship of counterfactual thinking with the overall function
of the OFC.
FICTIVE ERROR
One line of research investigating neural processing of counterfac-
tual outcomes draws from computational accounts of reinforce-
ment learning, in which reward prediction errors drive learning.
This line of research extends reinforcement learning to also include
“fictive errors” in addition to prediction errors, which are both
thought to drive learning. The term fictive error refers to the
difference between an actually experienced outcome and a coun-
terfactual outcome (what would have happened if a different
choice had been made). It is therefore directly related to regret and
relief. A number of studies have shown that fictive error signals
both drive subsequent behavior and correlate with neural activ-
ity in specific brain regions. For example, one fMRI study used
a sequential investment task in which the subject experienced an
outcome for each decision, but was also aware of the counterfac-
tual outcome if the choice had been different (76). The ongoing
difference between the best possible counterfactual outcome and
the actually experienced outcome (the fictive error signal) influ-
enced subsequent choices in the task – larger fictive errors led
to larger changes in investment behavior. Additionally, the fic-
tive error signal correlated with activity in the ventral caudate, a
reward-related region that receives dopaminergic input. A study
employing similar methods to examine differences between smok-
ers and non-smokers found that both smokers and non-smokers
showed a robust fictive error signal in the caudate (77). However,
smokers, unlike non-smokers, were not guided by this fictive error
signal in terms of behavior. Fictive reward signals have also been
investigated in animals; a study using monkeys found that neurons
in the ACC respond both to actually experienced rewards and to
fictive rewards (counterfactual outcomes of choices that were not
made) (78).
SELF-ESTEEM
Self-related processing is an important influence on how counter-
factual thinking leads to a variety of emotions. In particular, exag-
gerated counterfactual-based emotions can lead to profoundly
painful experiences such as shame and guilt (26). Social sci-
entists have long been interested in the concept of self-esteem.
Research has suggested that self-esteem may play an important
role in human emotion, social relationships, and mental illness.
What follows is a selective review of the large literature on self-
esteem, focusing on the distinction between level of self-esteem
and security of self-esteem, the relationship between self-esteem
and counterfactual thinking, and neuroimaging studies related to
self-esteem and self-related processing more generally.
While a great deal of attention has been focused on the distinc-
tion between high and low self-reported self-esteem, the relevance
of this distinction in regard to psychological functioning has been
called into question (79–81). An alternative to level of self-esteem
is the security of self-esteem. A body of literature indicates that
secure high self-esteem, rather than high self-esteem in itself, is
associated with positive psychological functioning. Conversely,
fragile self-esteem is related to poor functioning in a number of
domains (79). There are two important attributes of fragile self-
esteem: it is unstable, and it is contingent on external factors.
Unstable or labile self-esteem tends to fluctuate from day to day
or within each day. Contingent self-esteem remains high only if
individuals meet internal or external standards of worthiness; for
example, it is only high in the event of an achievement or compli-
ment (79, 82). Contingent and labile self-esteem are related in that
people with self-esteem which is contingent on external factors also
tend to have more unstable self-esteem (83–86). People with fragile
high self-esteem are more prone to self-glorification, aggressive-
ness, and verbal defensiveness (a tendency to distort self-related
information) (79, 87–89). Additionally, these individuals have
lower overall levels of psychological well-being; comparatively,
individuals with secure high self-esteem are more autonomous,
have a clearer sense of meaning in their lives, relate more effec-
tively with their physical and social environments, and are more
self-accepting (79). This evidence for the negative consequences of
fragile self-esteem suggests that individuals with this type of brittle
self-representation are more sensitive to the affective consequences
of self-related information and outcomes. Their actual and antic-
ipated affective reactions to self-related information appears to
result in several maladaptive behavioral patterns, such as increased
aggressiveness, as well as overall poorer functioning.
SELF-ESTEEM, COUNTERFACTUAL THINKING, AND REGRET
Self-esteem has been related to counterfactual thinking. One study
examined counterfactuals which were spontaneously generated by
individuals who were high and low in self-esteem after imagin-
ing themselves interacting with another person (90). After failure,
subjects low in self-esteem were more likely to imagine themselves
behaving differently (i.e., imagine how they could have acted dif-
ferently to produce a better outcome). While the authors do not
use the term“regret,” their results suggest that individuals with low
self-esteem were more likely to feel regret by focusing on a superior
counterfactual outcome. Another study examined the interaction
between self-esteem and mood in counterfactual thinking (91).
When in negative moods, subjects with high self-esteem imag-
ined counterfactuals which were worse than the actual outcome
(which would tend to result in relief); subjects with low self-esteem
imagined counterfactuals which were better than the actual out-
comes (which would tend to result in regret or disappointment).
Together, these studies suggest that people with low self-esteem
compared to individuals with high self-esteem are more likely to
focus on how things could have gone better.
The effect of self-esteem and regret on decision-making has
been specifically examined. A study comparing low and high
self-esteem subjects found that differences in decision-making
only emerged when subjects expected to receive feedback on the
outcomes of their decisions (92). When feedback was expected,
subjects with low self-esteem were more likely to make choices
which avoided the possibility of large regrets. For example, they
were more likely to choose a certain $8 rather than a 66% chance
of $12 to avoid the regret associated with losing all the money.
When not expecting to receive feedback on the outcomes, the dif-
ference between high and low self-esteem subjects disappeared,
indicating the difference was not due merely to risk-aversion.
This study suggests that a motive to protect self-esteem from the
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threat of regret can influence decision-making. Further research
is needed examining the impact of secure vs. fragile self-esteem,
rather than merely level of self-esteem, on counterfactual thinking
and regret.
SELF-ESTEEM AND THE BRAIN
Neuroimaging has been used to investigate self-related processing
in general and self-esteem in particular. Self-related processing
compared to processing not related to the self appears to activate
midline brain structures including medial prefrontal and poste-
rior cingulate cortices (93–95). Several studies have investigated
the neural response to social feedback in people with low self-
esteem. In these individuals, social rejection is associated with
greater activation in the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dorsal
ACC) (96). Subjects with low self-esteem had enhanced activity
in ventral anterior cingulate cortex (vACC)/mPFC in response
to positive feedback (97). Another study showed that subjects
with lower state self-esteem in response to social feedback showed
greater activity in the dorsal ACC and anterior insula (98). Subjects
whose self-esteem decreased from prescan to postscan vs. those
whose self-esteem did not decrease showed greater medial pre-
frontal cortical activity. Overall, it appears that state and trait level
of self-esteem modulates the impact of events on the activation
of decision-making areas. Further research is needed examining
the relationship of security vs. fragility of self-esteem with neural
activation, rather than absolute level of self-esteem alone.
There are specific subpopulations of individuals with markedly
unstable and contingent self-esteem, prominently including bor-
derline personality disorder and narcissistic personality disor-
der, and the brain bases of these disorders are beginning to be
investigated. For example, borderline personality disorder is char-
acterized by markedly unstable self concept including unstable
self-esteem (99). Studies have indicated that patients with border-
line personality disorder may have abnormalities in the regions
noted above. For example, a volumetric MRI study found that
patients with borderline personality disorder had lower volumes
in the amygdala, left OFC, and right ACC, along with the hip-
pocampus (100). Functional studies have also found decreased
ventromedial PFC activity including medial OFC and subgenual
ACC during behavioral inhibition in the context of negative emo-
tion (101) and reduced activation of the subgenual and dorsal ACC
and the amygdala and greater activation in the insula and posterior
cingulate during negative emotionality (102). Patients with narcis-
sistic personality disorder tend to exhibit contingent and defensive
self-esteem (103). An fMRI study found that high narcissistic sub-
jects showed less deactivation of the insula during empathy (104),
and a structural MRI study found lower volume in left anterior
insula in patients with narcissistic personality disorder (105). The
relationship between unstable, contingent self-esteem, and neural
processes in patients with borderline personality disorder and
narcissistic personality disorder remains to be established.
DECISION-MAKING, COUNTERFACTUAL THINKING, AND
SELF-ESTEEM IN DEPRESSION
DEPRESSION AND COUNTERFACTUAL THINKING
Some research has examined the relationship of depression with
altered counterfactual thinking. One study examined the types of
counterfactual thoughts generated by subjects with mild depres-
sion. When mildly depressed subjects considered how things could
have gone better, they tended to focus on factors that were more
controllable than did non-depressed subjects (106). This is inter-
preted as reflecting an attempt on the part of mildly depressed
individuals to increase their sense of control, a tendency that
has been shown in prior studies (107, 108). Presumably, however,
focusing on controllable factors after a negative outcome results
in increased regret by highlighting how one could have prevented
the outcome. Contrasting with this study, a later study found that
severely depressed subjects tended to generate counterfactuals that
were less controllable, less reasonable, and more characterological
in nature (109). These counterfactual thoughts are argued to be
similar to other types of negative cognitive distortions in severe
depression.
DEPRESSION AND REGRET
Several studies have examined the relationship between depres-
sion and regret. Scores on a regret-proneness scale are positively
correlated with the Beck Depression Inventory (14). In a sam-
ple of older adults, the intensities of loss-and-grief related regrets
were correlated with scores on the Geriatric Depression Scale,
although regret only explained a small amount of the variance
in depression scores (110). Mildly depressed subjects making a
hypothetical hiring decision exhibited more regret after a deci-
sion, regardless of which decision they actually made (111). This
study assessed depression by having a random sample of col-
lege undergraduates fill out the Beck Depression Inventory; no
psychiatric interview was performed. Another study, using a tele-
phone survey, found that regret was associated with anhedonic
depression and anxious arousal (112). Anhedonic depression was
assessed with an eight-item scale rather than a full psychiatric
interview. Contrasting with these results, a study using a com-
puterized decision-making task found that individuals with major
depression experienced less regret, an effect that was particularly
related to self-reported apathy scores (113). This study used DSM-
IV criteria to identify depressed subjects. Given the limited and
inconsistent evidence about the relationship between depression
and regret, further research is clearly needed to investigate this
issue.
DEPRESSION AND SELF-ESTEEM
Depression is closely related to self-esteem. The role of feelings
toward the self has been an important consideration within diverse
theoretical perspectives, including psychoanalytic and cognitive
theories of depression (114–118). The DSM-V includes feelings
of worthlessness as a symptom of major depression (119). Low
levels of self-esteem have been related to prediction of depres-
sive episodes as well as course and recovery (120, 121). However,
beyond average level of self-esteem, instability of self-esteem is a
crucial factor in depression (118, 122). In particular, research has
consistently found that unstable self-esteem is a better prospective
predictor of depression than low trait self-esteem (15, 16, 122–
125). Unstable self-esteem also interacts with stressful life events
in predicting depression; those who have unstable self-esteem are
more likely to respond to a stressful event by becoming depressed
(15, 16, 122, 126).
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ALTERATIONS IN DECISION-RELATED BRAIN AREAS IN DEPRESSION
The literature on the neurobiology of depression is vast, and a
summary of findings in this area is outside the scope of this
review. However, it is useful to address evidence for abnormalities
in decision-related brain areas in depression. Because these same
brain areas also play a role in counterfactual thinking, this research
can inform our model of abnormal counterfactual processing in
decision-making in depression. It is important to note the het-
erogeneous nature of research on depression, given differences in
study populations in terms of severity, chronicity, inpatient vs.
outpatient samples, concomitant treatments, comorbid disorders,
and other differences. There have been hundreds of fMRI stud-
ies demonstrating abnormalities in decision-related brain areas in
depression, many of which use decision-making and reward task.
For a more comprehensive discussion of this area, there are several
recent reviews (127, 128).
One set of areas which have been shown to exhibit altered
activity in depression are those that have also been implicated
in encoding subjective value in decision-making tasks including
the ventral striatum and OFC (20). In a neuroimaging study, indi-
viduals with depression showed decreased activity in regions of
the ventral striatum in response to positive stimuli (129). Another
study found a lack of activity in the medial caudate and ventro-
medial OFC in response to feedback on cognitive tasks (130). In a
study of pediatric MDD, children with depression showed less acti-
vation of the caudate and regions of the OFC in a decision-making
task (131). Depressed individuals show functional abnormalities
in posterior lateral and medial OFC (132). In contrast, activity
in anterolateral OFC and ventromedial frontal polar cortex is
increased in depression (132). It is important to note the evi-
dence reviewed above that, in normal subjects, activity in these
same brain areas is modulated not only by a stimulus or outcome
itself, but by unrealized alternatives.
Depression has also been associated with functional abnormal-
ities of the amygdala, an area which plays a key role in stimulus
processing, attention, and emotional learning (127, 133, 134).
While research examining a specific role for the amygdala in
altered decision-making in depression is limited, a number of
studies have demonstrated amygdala dysfunction in tasks involv-
ing response to emotional stimuli and emotion regulation. For
example, patients with depression show greater amygdala activ-
ity when anticipating negative emotional stimuli (135). A study of
young subjects with depression (ages 15–24 years) found increased
activation of the amygdala in response to positive social feed-
back (136). Depressed adolescents also have increased amyg-
dala activity during an emotion regulation task (requiring them
to notice and maintain an emotional reaction) (137). Multiple
neuroimaging studies have found that depressed patients have
increased amygdala activity in response to sad faces, thought
to reflect a processing bias in depression (127, 138, 139). As
discussed above, the amygdala has been implicated in coun-
terfactual thinking and regret (13, 68, 72). Further research is
needed to explore a possible role of altered amygdala func-
tion in decision-making, counterfactual thinking, and regret in
depression.
Depression is also associated with altered functioning of the
PFC. Some research has focused on alterations in this region
during decision-making tasks, although this is still somewhat lim-
ited. Depressed subjects had decreased activation of the middle
frontal gyrus during reward selection and anticipation in a gam-
bling task (140). A decision-making study found that healthy
adolescents, but not depressed adolescents, showed a negative cor-
relation between activity in prefrontal areas and high-risk behavior
(141). This suggests alteration of prefrontal function in risk and
reward in depression, although further research is needed to clar-
ify the implications of this finding. Overall, depression appears
to be associated with reduced activity in the dorsolateral PFC,
which is implicated in cognitive control; this reduced activity is
specifically associated with psychomotor retardation and anhedo-
nia (127, 128). Contrastingly, depressed subjects show increased
activity in the ventromedial PFC, which is involved in genera-
tion of emotions, autonomic regulation, pain, and social behavior,
among other functions (127, 128).
Finally, depressed individuals have alterations in functioning
of the ACC. One study found decreased activity of rostral cingu-
late gyrus during reward selection and anticipation in a gambling
task (140). An fMRI study of pediatric depression using a gam-
bling task found decreased ACC activity during the decision phase,
especially during a high-magnitude reward condition (142). The
same study also found decreased ACC activity during the outcome
phase in response to losses and small gains. Contrastingly, a study
of depressed adolescents found increased activity in the right cau-
dal ACC during the selection phase of a monetary decision task
(141). Other research has investigated ACC differences not specif-
ically related to decision-making. For example, depressed subjects
showed increased activation of subgenual ACC to emotional stim-
uli in an fMRI study (143). Dorsal ACC, however, appears to be
less active in depression (144). Given the heterogeneity of findings,
more research is needed to clarify the role of ACC in depression,
which may differ by sub-region, task, and population.
A SIMPLE MODEL OF THE ROLE OF SELF-ESTEEM AND
COUNTERFACTUAL THINKING IN DEPRESSION
Based on the evidence reviewed above, a model is proposed here in
which fragile self-esteem and counterfactual thinking play impor-
tant and interrelated roles in decision-making in mild and mod-
erate depression. The model (see Figure 1) applies to situations in
which an individual has made a decision resulting in a suboptimal
outcome; that is, an alternate choice would have produced a better
outcome. In both non-depressed and depressed individuals, such
a situation will result in self-related counterfactual thoughts, i.e.,
“what if I had chosen differently.” These thoughts will lead to feel-
ings of regret, an aversive emotion. Regret is a normal emotion
that is experienced at times by both depressed and non-depressed
individuals. However, it is proposed here that regret is intensified
in mild to moderate depression, and that an important contribu-
tor to this process is fragile self-esteem, which is found in mild to
moderate depression. Within the model, fragile self-esteem affects
regret through two separate processes.
The first process by which fragile self-esteem influences regret
is through increased vigilance for potential threats to self-esteem.
This process may be mediated by the amygdala, which is believed
to be involved in the attribution of emotional salience and in
emotional attention (133, 134). Importantly, increased amygdala
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FIGURE 1 | A model of the role of self-esteem fragility and
counterfactual thinking in mild to moderate depression. In both
non-depressed and mildly to moderately depressed individuals,
learning that a different choice would have had a better outcome will
result in self-related counterfactual thoughts, i.e., “what if I had
chosen differently.” These thoughts will lead to feelings of regret, an
aversive emotion. However, individuals with mild to moderate
depression are more prone to regret because they have fragile
self-esteem. In the model, fragile self-esteem will affect regret in two
ways: (1) fragile self-esteem will result in greater vigilance for threats
to self-esteem, including suboptimal decision outcomes. This vigilance
is mediated by the amygdala, and increases attention focused on
superior outcomes of alternate choices. This increased focus on the
superior outcome will result in a decrease in subjective valuation of
the actual outcome. The decrease in subjective value is mediated by
the orbitofrontal cortex and is manifested by decreased striatum
activation and (2) fragile self-esteem will be more highly damaged in
response to learning that a decision outcome is suboptimal (a
separate process from the increased vigilance for self-esteem threat
in individuals with fragile self-esteem). This damage to self-esteem is
affectively aversive and is mediated by increased activation of the
anterior cingulate cortex and insula.
activation is tied to depression (138) and regret (72). Learning
that the outcome of one’s decision was suboptimal may result in
self-blame and be threatening to self-esteem. The increased vigi-
lance for threats to self-esteem in mild to moderate depression will
therefore cause increased attention to be devoted to counterfactual
scenarios in which an alternative choice would have produced a
better outcome. This increase in attention to the superior counter-
factual outcome then results in decreased subjective value of the
actual outcome, in comparison to the counterfactual outcome.
This process may be mediated by the OFC, which integrates infor-
mation to evaluate outcomes and is involved in regret (31, 65, 73,
74). The result will be decreased activation of the striatum, reflect-
ing a lower value attached to the actual outcome. This decrease in
subjective valuation of the outcome is one of the components of
the affective experience of regret as formulated in the model.
The second process by which self-esteem fragility influences
regret is through the increased damage to self-esteem incurred
when a different choice would have had a better outcome.
Thoughts about a superior counterfactual outcome of a differ-
ent choice will have greater effect on self-esteem when self-esteem
is fragile. This will result in an aversive emotional experience.
This process may be mediated by the ACC and insula, which
have been shown to have higher activity in people with reduc-
tions in state self-esteem in response to social feedback (98). These
regions have been associated with regret (13, 31) and have shown
differential activation in depression (145). Within the model’s
formulation of regret, the aversive damage to self-esteem is one
of the components of the emotional experience of regret, along
with the reduced value associated with the actual outcome of the
decision.
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Some aspects of the model are supported by current evidence,
whereas others are more speculative. The model proposes two
components of regret that affect people with depression: reduced
subjective value of actual outcomes in comparison to superior
alternatives, and damage to self-esteem that is mediated by self-
esteem fragility. Regarding the first component, there are a number
of studies on normal subjects, reviewed above, showing that the
subjective value of an outcome is reduced when it is compared to
superior hypothetical alternatives. Whether and how this differs
in depression, however, is largely untested. For the second compo-
nent, there is a sizable amount of evidence that fragile self-esteem
is linked to a higher risk for depression. However, the connection
between fragile self-esteem and regret has been almost entirely
unexplored.
This model focuses primarily on individuals with mild to mod-
erate depression. In severely depressed individuals, other process
may contribute to dysfunction of decision-making, including
severe cognitive distortions, apathy, and affective blunting (109,
113). It is even possible that severe apathy and blunted respon-
siveness to positive outcomes may decrease regret, due to reduced
appreciation for a missed, positive outcome. This may help explain
the discrepancy in studies investigating regret in depression, in
which milder depression tends to be associated with increased
regret, while at least one study finds that more severe depression is
associated with decreased regret (although this needs more study)
(14, 110–113). However, the model may be relevant to the devel-
opment of severe depression, which may have been preceded by
a period of mild to moderate depression or by a period in which
the person was not depressed, yet possessed an underlying vul-
nerability to the development of depression in the form of fragile
self-esteem.
The model generates a number of testable predictions. First,
mildly and moderately depressed subjects should experience
increased regret after learning an alternative decision would have
produced a better outcome (e.g., as measured by self-report in
a simple gambling task). The same finding would be expected
for individuals with fragile self-esteem. In addition to self-report
differences, depressed subjects may also show differences in the
behavioral influence of “fictive error” signals, reflecting the dif-
ference between counterfactual and actual outcomes, in a task
similar to the sequential investment tasks from previous fictive
error studies (76, 77). Another expected finding is that mildly and
moderately depressed subjects and those with fragile self-esteem
will exhibit increased attention to superior counterfactual out-
comes of alternative choices, when these are revealed by feedback.
This might be measured by eye movement tracking, which has pre-
viously been used to measure attentional biases in mental illness
including anxiety disorders and depression (146–148).
In terms of neuroimaging, it is predicted that individuals with
mild to moderate depression and those with fragile self-esteem
will show altered neural responses to learning that the outcome
of a different choice would have been superior to the one which
was actually received. Specifically, activity in OFC, ACC, the insula,
and the amygdala will be increased, whereas activity in the striatum
will be decreased. Several of these areas may also be active while
making a choice and while anticipating the outcome; these may
include the amygdala and OFC. It is also predicted that depressed
individuals will show alterations in neural “fictive error” signals,
which may be detected in fMRI studies (76, 77).
This model is not intended to be comprehensive, and cer-
tainly leaves out many important factors in the development of
depression. However, it presents a framework for the relationship
between several processes which are thought to play important
roles in depression. Furthermore, it generates testable hypotheses
which might help to further clarify the processes involved in this
disorder. Finally, it may assist in the development of interventions
specifically targeting the altered processing of counterfactuals in
depression.
The model relates to decision-making, a growing field with
contributions from economists, psychologists, and neuroscien-
tists. The neural underpinnings of decision-making processes are
beginning to be illuminated, and these findings may be useful
to understanding the neurobiology of depression. It is interest-
ing to note that the brain areas involved in decision-making also
appear to play a role in counterfactual thinking, self-esteem, and
depression. Further elucidation of the neural correlates of these
processes, and their interrelationships, could be a step toward a
more integrated theory of depression.
CLINICAL IMPLICATIONS
This review has presented previous research on counterfactual
thinking, depression, and self-esteem, and presented a model of
how counterfactual thinking and self-esteem abnormalities may
be linked in depression. The aim is to establish a better mech-
anistic understanding of the specific processing dysfunctions in
this disorder, which will help to develop better treatments that
are targeted specifically toward correcting these dysfunctional
processes. Specifically, treatment may attempt to diminish the
influence of counterfactual comparisons on self-representation,
thereby decreasing levels of regret. There are several possible
avenues for treatment approaches. These may include exposure
protocols to reduce the affective impact of regretted outcomes,
cognitive approaches to challenge unrealistic counterfactual sce-
narios, or training to reduce attentional bias toward superior
alternative outcomes. One possible treatment method to accom-
plish these goals would be a computerized training approach. This
might involve a computerized decision-making game to facili-
tate exposure to regretted outcomes or to help correct attentional
biases. Such interventions are examples of treatment approaches
which are targeted toward specific pathologic processes identified
in research (149). This is somewhat similar to a previous group-
based approach targeting memory dysfunction (150) and a com-
puterized approach targeting negative cognitive bias (151). Given
that the dysfunctional counterfactual and self-esteem processes
may be linked to specific brain regions, it may even be possible
to target these dysfunctions with biological approaches including
repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS), transcranial
direct-current stimulation (tDCS), and deep brain stimulation
(DBS) targeting the highlighted regions. Overall, it is hoped that
adding to our knowledge of the specific processes involved in
depression will help identify and treat the particular difficulties
faced by those with this common and burdensome disorder.
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